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Flare Incident Analysis

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Flare Incident Analysis

Introduction

On 13 November, 2022 at 03:31:28 PM +UTC the CertiK Skynet system alerted a suspicious price slippage on the Flare token of over 63%. Following our investigation, CertiK determined that the Flare token project had conducted an exit scam by taking advantage of the initial token distribution. Flare Token was created on 2 October at 07:06:49 AM +UTC, 42 days before the exploit. At the time of the exploit, Flare token had approximately 15,246 holders.

It is unclear what the token was designed to do as there are no social media accounts or coverage of the project discovered thus far. The exploiter received 3,973,277,600.69 Flare tokens from Flare token deployer and associated addresses. The exploiter stole approximately $18.5 million in holders funds.

Attack Flow

  1. The Flare deployer minted (opens in a new tab) 10,000,000,000 Flare token when deploying the Flare token smart contract:

    Blog Image 1

  2. The Flare deployer then transfers (opens in a new tab) 6,999,800,000 Flare tokens to an unverified smart contract 0xeae (opens in a new tab):

    blog image 2

  3. Deployer of unverified smart contract transfers (opens in a new tab) 6,999,023,050.53 Flare tokens to 0xf99 (opens in a new tab):

    blog image 3

  4. 0xf99 transfers (opens in a new tab) 3,973,277,600.69 Flare tokens to 0xa0a (opens in a new tab):

    blog image 4

  5. 0xa0a swaps (opens in a new tab) 1,000,000,000 Flare tokens to 16,942,732.78 BUSD, and then swaps (opens in a new tab) 1,973,277,600.69 Flare tokens to Future tokens.

  6. 0xa0a finally swaps (opens in a new tab) 1,307,251.13 future tokens to 1,568,981.16 BUSD:

    blog image 5

Addresses

Flare token contract: 0x85a (opens in a new tab)

Flare token contract deployer: 0x0d4 (opens in a new tab)

Unverified smart contract used in the exploit: 0xeae (opens in a new tab)

Deployer of unverified smart contract: 0x2d1 (opens in a new tab)

Exploiter: 0xa0a (opens in a new tab)

Exploit Transactions

In this transaction, 0xa0a swaps Flare tokens to BUSD: https://bscscan.com/tx/0x2af9b1c4f4b063a31babe75d0a7ef711e063d7ecb10cb0ecd6f572c8971c1d51 (opens in a new tab)

0xa0a then swap Flare tokens to Future token: https://bscscan.com/tx/0x4cc3211b0b0e7d4b56a85047f23138fc31c60edd7ab754c0b1b47eb6ba73ac9c (opens in a new tab)

Finally, 0xa0a swaps Future tokens to BUSD: https://bscscan.com/tx/0x4c6391df7db48dff09184c3b6f3bcd00c09bf2bb11442d13224f03249d08008a (opens in a new tab)

Example of exploiter transferring funds to be sent to tornado cash:

  1. 0xa0a transfers stolen funds to 0xe55 (opens in a new tab):
    blog image 6
  2. Stolen funds are then washed (opens in a new tab) by 0xe55 to tornado.cash:
    blog image 7

Profits and Asset Tracing

At the time of writing, around 1,000,000,000 Flare tokens were swapped for 16,942,732.78 BUSD and another 1,973,277,600.69 Flare tokens were swapped to Future tokens. Future tokens were then swapped to 1,568,981.16 BUSD. The total stolen funds of this exploit is around $18.5 million. As 28 November, 0xe55 only holds a remaining 0.06 BNB.

Conclusion

It is almost certain that the Flare token was designed to be an exit scam from the beginning. The issue lies within intentional poor contract design and the initial token distribution created by the contract deployers.

Protect yourself and your assets by following @CertiKAlert on Twitter to stay up to date on all the latest Web3 security news, and visiting certik.com as part of your due diligence.

Do your own research and beware of scam tokens!

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