
Incident Summary
On 01 June 2026 an attacker drained dozens of GnosisPay Safes on Gnosis Chain. The attack vector was a signature-verification flaw in the GnosisPay Delay module.
The module checks transactions via moduleTxSignedBy(). It parses r,s,v values from attacker-controlled msg.data. By crafting nested signature data, the attacker caused verification to traverse first through a Biconomy Safe and then to an attacker-controlled contract that always returned the EIP-1271 magic value. As a result, the module incorrectly accepted the transaction as authorized.
The attacker queued 41 transactions, waited out the module's cooldown, then executed them. Each transferred EURe and GNO to attacker wallets leading to the loss of ~$265K.
Key Addresses

Attack Flow
May-29-2026 01:29:55 PM
- The attacker deployed 41 attack contracts (Example Transaction (opens in a new tab)). These contracts are designed to always revert with isValidSignature() / 0x1626ba7e message.

Jun-01-2026 05:26:10 AM - Transaction (opens in a new tab)
- Call Delay execTransactionFromModule().
The first part of msg.data is parsed as (address to, uint256 value, bytes calldata data, Enum.Operation operation) which was queued.






r = 0x7f59e536f083a63b67adfe3bc793a47744dba7d80,
s = 0xd957b7cc73ae8d40082124eb2a67284d8e287babfe4e6859f0772a1eab8c54af





Jun-01-2026 05:57:35 - Transaction (opens in a new tab)
- Call Delay.executeNextTx() to execute custom calldata which transferred EURe and GNO from the victim to the attacker.
The target was set as the victim Gnosis Safe in the initializing transaction (opens in a new tab),

Vulnerability
The root cause of this incident is due to the verification process in Delay.execTransactionFromModule() -> moduleOnly() -> moduleTxSignedBy() which parsed the r,s,v values from the end of the attacker’s msg.data. In particular the r address was called to as a signer for verification.


Fund Flow
Exploit wallet 0x81BA8A2b895D30280bca199C2Ff75f3F058d4C6c bridged (opens in a new tab) ~$246k USDT from Ethereum to Hyperliquid network. The funds were then sent to wallet 0xb1834575349c6eb56675c35b4109c3d3a77dd2fc where part of the funds swapped for XMR.

- 147,494.91 USDC
- 1.5174 ETH (~$2,700)
- 28.32 XMR (~$9,903.55)
Additional XMR was split into four wallets:
- 0xcce200e0df2f6d47ccffc0e64e6fddc145b13f67 (27.33 XMR)
- 0x3eb18b54a2f7500c3a581197cf7d9fbd62516160 (55.06 XMR)
- 0x0dda0f6aa7b3e0ec1273c4e47c56e7bed57a308c (69.30 XMR)
- 0x31c2c0c4ab37a89d38968735f8ad9f04e332576a (83.31 XMR)
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